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Developments in the Laws Affecting Electronic
Payments and Stored-Value Products: A Year of
Stored-Value Bankruptcies, Significant Legislative
Proposals, and Federal Enforcement Actions
By Patricia Allouise, Sarah Jane Hughes, and Stephen T Middlebrook*
INTRODUCTION
Electronic payment products are eclipsing traditional check-based payments
in the United States. A study by the Federal Reserve System released in Novem-
ber 2007 reports that check payments are decreasing and more than two thirds
* Members of the Electronic Payments Working Group, Committee on Cyberspace Law, ABA Sec-
tion of Business Law. The Working Group thanks the Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington
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Professor Hughes was with the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Consumer Protection. The
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220 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 64, November 2008
of all U.S. noncash payments in 2006 were made electronically 1 The report
noted that:
Within the industry, various providers and analysts have published differing esti-
mates both for current prepaid volumes and also for future projections of volume.
Sometimes these estimates vary substantially from one source to the next, ranging
from $95.4 billion in spend[ing] for all prepaid in 2006 to $50 billion for closed loop
gift card sales in 2006 to $160 billion in just open loop, branded prepaid spen[t] in
2007.2
With so much volume, legal issues arise. These include questions about what
law, if any, governs a particular payment product or dispute about a payment,
whether provision of certain payments services or issuance of certain products
constitutes "money transmission" or the "sale of stored value" for purposes of
federal Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements, and who should bear losses as-
sociated with breaches of data security in payments systems.
This is the third Survey on laws pertaining to stored-value and other electronic
payment products by the Working Group on Electronic Payments Systems. Our
2007 Survey covered subjects such as preemption of state regulation of gift-card
terms and marketing under federal bank regulatory authority,3 the increase in
the number of states directly regulating both gift and payroll cards,4 significant
federal statutory and regulatory developments including the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 ("UIGEA"), and significant federal enforce-
ment actions.
6
Part I of this Survey covers developments pertaining to gift and payroll cards,
including new state laws and the proper disposition of gift-card value when the
retailer issuing the card files for bankruptcy Part II discusses recent federal leg-
islation and regulations pertaining to the UIGEA and resulting compensation
1. FED. RESERVE Sys., THE 2007 FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY: NONCASH PAYMENT TRENDS IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2003-2006 14 (2007), available at http://www.frbservices.org/files/communications/
pdf/research/2007_payments.study.pdf.
2. FED. RESERVE Sys., THE ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS TUDY: A SURVEY OF ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS FOR THE 2007
FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY 28 (2008), available at http://www.frbservices.org/files/communica
tionsfpdf/research/2007 electronic-payments.studypdf.
3. Sarah Jane Hughes, Stephen T. Middlebrook & Broox W Peterson, Developments in the Law
Concerning Stored-Value Cards and Other Electronic Payments Products, 63 Bus. LAw. 237, 247-51 (2007)
[hereinafter "2007 Survey"]. Consistent with the decisions described in the 2007 Survey, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in December 2007 upheld a district court decision that the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency was the sole enforcer of national banks' compliance with federal
and state laws. The court thus ended the efforts by the State of New York begun in 2005 to gain ac-
cess to records of several national banks to determine compliance with state anti-discrimination laws.
The court wrote: "Congress has already expressed its intent to limit the role of the states in regulating
national banks .... We do not perceive the need for any further statement of intent to achieve the
limitation at issue here." Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C. v. Cuomo, 510 F3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 2007).
For reactions to the decision, see Cheyenne Hopkins, OCC Wins Appeal in New York Preemption Case,
AM. BANKER, Dec. 5, 2007, at 1.
4. 2007 Survey, supra note 3, at 251-53.
5. Id. at 266-68.
6. Id. at 255-64.
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claims against the United States before the World Trade Organization ("WTO").
Part III covers the card and expiration date truncation requirements of the Fair
and Accurate Credit Transactions Act ("FACT Act"), the Credit and Debit Card
Receipt Clarification Act of 2007, and, very briefly, a clarification to Regulation E
on electronic disclosures and the E-Sign Act. Part IV discusses the legal fallout
from two spectacularly large breaches of data security at TJX Corporation and
Hannaford Brothers. Part V covers other federal legislation introduced pertaining
to electronic payments. Part VI discusses major new federal enforcement actions
pertaining to electronic payments and updates the status of the United States'
prosecution of e-gold Ltd.
I. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW PERTAINING TO GIFT CARDS
AND PAYROLL CARDS: A BANKRUPTCY LESSON FOR GIFT
CARD HOLDERS AND A FEW NEW STATE LAWS
A. GIFT CARDS AND RETAILER-ISSUER BANKRUPTCY
The bankruptcy of a gift-card issuer-retailer is a significant risk of gift-card
programs. The recent bankruptcy filing of Shaper Image Corporation ("Sharper
Image") illustrates those risks.
When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, the automatic stay prevents creditors
from taking action to obtain possession of property of the estate or to recover on
a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the petition.7
A debtor-retailer may, however, sometimes seek permission from the court to con-
tinue to honor gift cards that were issued prior to the filing of the bankruptcy peti-
tion.' On February 19, 2008, retailer Sharper Image filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy
petition.9 The retailer filed a motion with the court on February 20, 2008, to
honor certain prepetition customer programs.'° Although on the date of the bank-
ruptcy filing the face value of outstanding gift cards and online gift certificates was
$19,589,253, Sharper Image was not seeking interim authority to honor the gift
cards and gift certificates but only other customer programs such as massage chair
merchandise certificates."
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006).
8. Bankruptcy cases involving retailers Kmart and Linens n' Things are examples. See Motion for
an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 365 and 507(a)(6) Authorizing Continuation of Certain
Customer Practices at 1-2, In re Kmart Corp., No. 02-B02474 (Bankr. E.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2002); Mo-
tion of the Debtors and Debtors in Possession for an Order Authorizing the Debtors to Honor Certain
Prepetition Customer Programs at 1, In re Linens Holdings Co., No. 08-10832 (Bankr. D. Del. May 2,
2008).
9. See Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition, In re Sharper Image Corp., No. 08-10322 (Bankr. D. Del.
Feb. 19, 2008).
10. See Motion of Debtor Pursuant to Section 105(a), 363(b), and 503(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Code for Authorization to Honor Certain Prepetition Customer Programs, In re Sharper Image Corp.,
No. 08-10322 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 20, 2008).
11. Id. at 5, 9. Seven days after Sharper Image filed for bankruptcy, a competitor, Brookstone, an-
nounced that it would provide customers holding a Sharper Image gift card a one-time 25 percent
discount off of a Brookstone purchase. See Press Release, Brookstone, Brookstone Converts Sharper
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On March 3, 2008, Sharper Image also sought authority to honor the outstand-
ing gift cards and online gift certificates. 12 In its supplemental motion, Sharper
Image stated that customers had complained that Sharper Image was unwilling
to honor the gift cards; such inability to honor gift cards had negatively impacted
sales; and a competitor had sought to capitalize on the inability of Sharper Image
to honor its gift cards. 13 However, Sharper Image sought to honor the gift cards
with the restriction that a customer using a gift card had to purchase an item that
cost double the value of the gift card.
14
California, Connecticut, Kentucky, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Oregon, and
Tennessee filed a limited objection to Sharper Image's supplemental motion. 5
The states objected to Sharper Image's motion, in part because the debtor had not
given "adequate accurate information to the press and the public" to give the states
an adequate opportunity to respond. 16 The states also argued that the two-for-one
program violated state consumer protection laws, such as unfair or deceptive acts
or practices ("UDAP") statutes,' 7 which are not preempted by the Bankruptcy
Code. "'8 American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. ("American
Express"), also filed an objection contending that the modified gift-card policy
Sharper Image proposed was forbidden by the reward participation agreement
between American Express and Sharper Image.' 9
Despite the objections filed by the states and American Express, the court
approved Sharper Image's modified certificate program.20 The State of Califor-
nia, however, had filed in state court a request for a temporary order to enjoin
Sharper Image from violating California laws related to business practices through
Image Gift Cards and Gift Certificates to 25 Percent Off Store Purchase (Feb. 27, 2008), http://www.
brookstone.com/bs assets/files/pdf/corporate/BrookstoneRelease022708.pdf. Another retailer, Aerus,
formerly Electrolux, announced a similar offer. See Press Release, Aerus LLC, Sharper Image Gift Cards
Redeemable at Aerus (Mar. 10, 2008), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2008/03/prweb752824.htm.
12. Supplement to Motion of Debtor Pursuant to Section 105(a), 363(b), and 503(b)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code for Authorization to Honor Certain Prepetition Customer Programs at 4, In re
Sharper Image Corp., No. 08-10322 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 3, 2008).
13. Id. at 3.
14. Id. at 4. For example, if a customer held a $50 gift card, the customer would get the full value
of the $50 gift card only if he or she purchased at least $100 worth of goods. See id.
15. Limited Objection of the [States] to the Supplement to Motion of Debtor Pursuant to Section
105(a), 363(b), and 503(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code for Authorization to Honor Certain Prepetition
Customer Programs, In re Sharper Image Corp., No. 08-10322 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 6, 2008) [herein-
after "State Limited Objection"].
16. Id. at 5.
17. See id. at 6, 9.
18. See id. at 8.
19. (1) Preliminary Objection of American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. to Sup-
plement to Motion of Debtor Pursuant to Section 105(a), 363(b), and 503(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Code for Authorization to Honor Certain Prepetition Customer Programs and (II) Joinder of American
Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. to the Motion For Extension of Time to Object and
Limited Objection Filed by the States at 1-2, In re Sharper Image Corp., No. 08-10322 (Bankr. D. Del.
Mar. 6, 2008).
20. In re Sharper Image Corp., No. 08-10322, slip op. at 2 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 7, 2008) ("Supple-
mental Order Pursuant to Sections 105(a), 363(b), and 503(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code Authorizing
Debtor to Honor Certain Prepetition Customer Programs").
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its modified certificate program. 21 The State alleged that Sharper Image violated
"California's gift certificate statute by failing to honor gift certificates or exchange
them for cash as required by law, and ... California's Consumer Legal Remedies
Act by advising their customers that their gift certificates cannot be used, or can
only be used if customers comply with additional requirements not part of the
gift certificate transaction, including the requirement to purchase additional mer-
chandise. '22 In a memorandum accompanying the application for the temporary
restraining order, the Office of the California Attorney General also contended
that under California law, the value of a store's gift certificate is the property of the
beneficiary of the certificate, not property of the issuer of the card, and that the
issuer merely holds the value in trust on behalf of the beneficiary.23 The Superior
Court of California denied the request for an injunction, stating, "Notwithstand-
ing the lack of showing of irremedi [able] harm and the fact that Plaintiff is seeking
mandatory injunctive relief, it appears this lawsuit is directed at pre-petition debt
of the debtor, and this Court is without jurisdiction, in light of the automatic stay
provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code, to make any ruling.
24
A holder of a gift card faces uncertainty if the card issuer files for bankruptcy If
the retailer closes shop completely, the only option for the gift-card holder may be to
file a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court.25 If the retailer seeks to reorganize,
the court may approve a motion that allows the retailer-debtor to honor the gift card
under the original terms. Last, other retailer-debtors could follow the example set
by Sharper Image and try to modify the terms of its gift card program, leaving card
holders with a choice between using the card as modified or filing a claim with the
bankruptcy court, 26 or even using the card elsewhere if another company offers a
promotion that allows the gift-card holder to use the gift card as a coupon.
21. Plaintiff's Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Re Pre-
liminary Injunction, People v. Sharper Image Corp., No. RG 08-374889 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2008).
22. Id. at 2.
23. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 8, People v Sharper Image Corp., No. RG 08-
374889 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2008). California, Montana, Oklahoma, and Washington are states
with gift-card laws that maintain that the gift card is held in trust by the gift-card issuer on behalf of the
gift-card beneficiary and that, in the case of the issuer's bankruptcy, the issuer shall continue to honor
the card. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1749.6 (West Supp. 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-102 (2007);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 798 (West Supp. 2007); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.240.090 (West 2007).
24. People v. Sharper Image Corp., No. RG 08-374889, slip op. at 1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2008)
("Application Re: Temporary Restraining Order & OSC re Preliminary Injunction Denied").
25. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (2006). Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth a list of expenses
and claims that have priority. A gift-card holder may claim priority under section 507(a)(7), which states:
"Seventh, allowed unsecured claims of individuals, to the extent of $2,425 for each such individual, aris-
ing from the deposit, before the commencement of the case, of money in connection with the purchase,
lease, or rental of property, or the purchase of services, for the personal, family, or household use of such
individuals, that were not delivered or provided." Id. (footnote omitted). However, there is no guaranty
that there will be money left in a debtor's estate for the payout of a gift-card holder's claim.
26. For example, the states asked the court that, if it allowed the modified Sharper Image program,
it order the retailer "to adopt certain safeguards to ensure that consumers are not unwittingly forced to
buy added merchandise when they have the option of filing a priority expense claim and having their
consumer priority recognized and fully protected in the form of a cash payment at confirmation." State
Limited Objection, supra note 15, at 6.
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B. MAINE ENACTS LEGISLATION ON GIFT CARDS
The State of Maine was the only state to enact new legislation on gift cards since
our 2007 Survey. Maine's new law, signed on April 24, 2008, requires a merchant
redeeming a gift obligation or stored-value card to refund any balance on the card
less than $5 as long as the holder redeems the card in person.2 1 It explicitly does
not cover "prefunded" bank cards.
2 8
Gift-card legislation was introduced in seven states since our 2007 Survey.29
As of May 27, 2008, none of these bills had been enacted. As of now, state laws
govern only those cards that are not issued by national banks or federal savings
banks.
30
C. PAYROLL CARDS: Two STATES ENACT NEW
PAYROLL CARD LEGISLATION
Since the 2007 Survey,3' two states have enacted new laws on payroll cards.
Minnesota extended its existing payroll card statute beyond its original May 31,
2008, expiration date. 32 West Virginia's new payroll card law allows businesses to
pay wages through use of electronic payment cards or other electronic transfers if
the employee consents to payment by electronic method.
33
II. THE UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT
ACT OF 2006: PROPOSED FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND
THE UNITED STATES' RESPONSE TO WTO COMPENSATION
CLAIMS BY ANTIGUA AND OTHER COUNTRIES
Our 2007 Survey discussed the enactment of the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act of 2006 ("UIGEA" or "Act")3 4 and the successful prosecution
27. 2007 Me. Legis. Serv. 696 (West) (to be codified at ME. RE,. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1953(G)).
28. See id.
29. See H.B. 2591, 24th Leg., 2008 Sess. (Haw. 2008); H.S.B. 201, 82d Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Iowa
2008); A.B. 2603, 213th Leg., 2008 Sess. (NJ. 2008); A.B. 2751, 213th Leg., 2008 Sess. (N.J. 2008);
A.B. 2477, 213th Leg., 2008 Sess. (NJ. 2008); A.B. 2449, 213th Leg., 2008 Sess. (NJ. 2008); A.B.
1261, 213th Leg., 2008 Sess. (NJ. 2008); A. 11034, 2008 Leg., 231st Sess. (N.Y. 2008); H.B. 7398,
2008 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2008); S.B. 4038, 105th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Tenn. 2008); H.B. 3897,
105th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Tenn. 2008); A.B. 471, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2008).
30. See 2007 Survey, supra note 3, at 248-51. See also Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct.
1559, 1567 (2007); SPGCC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 F3d 525, 534-35 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.
Ct. 1258 (2008).
31. See 2007 Survey, supra note 3, at 242-45; Sarah Jane Hughes, Stephen T. Middlebrook & Broox
W Peterson, Developments in the Law Concerning Stored Value and Other Prepaid Payments Products, 62
Bus. LAw. 229, 241-43 (2006) [hereinafter "2006 Survey").
32. 2008 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 168 (West) (repealing the sunset provision in MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 177.255).
33. 2008 W Va. Acts ch. 129 (H.B. 4032) (Mar. 31, 2008) (to be codified at W VA. CODE
§ 21-5-3).
34. Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1952 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5361-67 (West Supp. 2008)).
The Act generally defines "unlawful Internet gambling" as "to place, receive, or otherwise knowingly
transmit a bet or wager by any means which involves the use ... of the Internet where such bet or
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by Antigua and Barbuda of related claims against the United States before the
WTO.35 The UIGEA makes it unlawful to take payments for debts incurred in
jurisdictions in which online gambling is illegal.3 6 Since our 2007 Survey, the
U.S. Department of the Treasury ("Treasury") and Federal Reserve Board ("FRB")
have published long-anticipated regulations to implement the Act, 37 Congress has
considered proposals to legalize and tax Internet gambling,38 and Congress has
held hearings on the UIGEA regulations. 39 In addition, other governments have
filed compensation claims with the WTO based on its decision in the Antigua
proceeding.
40
A. PROPOSED JOINT FRB/TREASURY REGULATIONS
TO IMPLEMENT THE UIGEA
On October 1, 2007, the FRB and Treasury announced proposed joint UIGEA
regulations, to be known as Regulation GG.4' The primary provisions (1) desig-
nate "certain payments systems that could be used in connection with unlawful
Internet gambling," (2) require participants in such systems "to establish policies
and procedures reasonably designed to identify and block or otherwise prevent or
prohibit transactions in connection with unlawful Internet gambling," (3) exempt
certain participants in designated payments systems from the requirements of the
regulations, (4) describe the "types of policies and procedures that non-exempt
participants in the designated payments systems may adopt to comply with the
Act and include[] non-exclusive examples of policies and procedures" that the
agencies deem "to be reasonably designed to prevent or prohibit unlawful Inter-
net gambling transactions restricted by the Act," and (5) explain the regulatory
wager is unlawful under any applicable Federal or State law in the State ... in which the bet is ...
made." UIGEA § 802(a), 31 U.S.C.A. § 5362(10) (West Supp. 2008). The Act exempts three types
of transactions: (1) certain intrastate bets or wagers, (2) intratribal transactions, and (3) interstate
horseracing transactions allowed under the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978. See id.
35. See 2007 Survey, supra note 3, at 266-68; see also Recourse to Article 22.6 Arbitration Report,
United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/
ARB (Dec. 21, 2007).
36. UIGEA § 802(a), 31 U.S.C.A. § 5363 (West Supp. 2008).
37. Prohibition of Funding of Unlawful Internet Gambling, 72 Fed. Reg. 56680 (proposed Oct. 4,
2007) (to be codified at 12 C.FR. pt. 233 & 31 C.ER. pt. 132).
38. See, e.g., Internet Gambling Regulation and Enforcement Act of 2007, H.R. 2046, 1 10th Cong.
(2007); Internet Gambling Regulation and Tax Enforcement Act of 2008, H.R. 5523, 110th Cong.
(2008).
39. See, e.g., Proposed UIGEA Regulations: Burden Without Benefit? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade, and Technology of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs.,
110th Cong. (Apr. 2, 2008), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcsdem/
hr040208.shtml; Hearing on Establishing Consistent Enforcement Policies in the Context of Online Wagers
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1 10th Cong. (Nov. 14, 2007), available at http://judiciary.house.
gov/hearings/hear_ 1 1407.html; Can Internet Gambling Be Effectively Regulated to Protect Consumers
and the Payments System? Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. (June 8, 2007),
available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcsdem/ht06O8O7.shtml.
40. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
41. See Prohibition on Funding of Unlawful Internet Gambling, 72 Fed. Reg. 56680.
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enforcement "framework."42 The FRB and Treasury have proposed that the regula-
tions take effect six months following publication of the joint final rules.4 3
The proposed rules define common payments terminology, including "auto-
mated clearing house system," "card system," "check collection system," 'money
transmitting business," "money transmitting service," and "wire transfer system,"
which may cause concern for providers, their lawyers, and courts because the
definitions differ significantly from those in prior Board guidance.4 4 The Board
maintains that the proposed definitions "are intended to be consistent with how
those terms are used in [the payment] systems [defined] .,,45 The definition of "card
systems" is especially significant; it includes "credit cards, debit cards, pre-paid
cards, [and] stored-value products ... used to purchase goods or services or to
obtain a cash advance. '46 Drawing upon existing definitions in FRB regulations,
the proposed rules define the scope of the Act, designating, for example, in the
case of check collection systems, "[t]he first banking office located in the United
States that receives a check from outside the United States for forward collection
inside the United States ... as the depositary bank for that check. 4
7
The proposed rules exempt participants in ACH systems, check collection
systems, and wire transfer systems, except for participants that "possess[] the
customer relationship with the Internet gambling business (and certain par-
ticipants that receive certain cross-border transactions from, or send certain
such transactions to, foreign payment service providers ... ).748 The reasoning
behind this exemption is the relative inability of these payments providers to
identify the line of business in which the payee engages (gambling or not) and
how the transfer was initiated (e.g., via the Internet) as compared to other sys-
tems that can identify both.
4 9
The proposed regulations require that payment systems establish policies and
procedures reasonably designed to prevent or prohibit unlawful Internet gam-
bling, including (1) due diligence-"flexible, risk-based" policies "consistent with
[participants'] regular account-opening policies";"° (2) remedial action, includ-
ing imposing fines, restricting access, and closing a customer's account, to en-
able the participant to follow up after it "becomes aware that one of its customer
relationships was being used to process restricted transactions";51 (3) monitoring
of web sites and payment patterns to particular recipients to detect possible re-
stricted transactions and suspicious patterns;52 and (4) coding-in card systems
42. Id. at 56680-81.
43. Id. at 56682.
44. See id. at 56683-85.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 56684.
47. See id. (citing, inter alia, 12 CER. § 229.2(e) & (o) (2008)).
48. Id. at 56685.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 56688.
51. Id. at 56689.
52. Id.
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especially-to enable identification and denial of restricted transactions.5 3 In addi-
tion, participants must pay attention to cross-border relationships because "most
unlawful Internet gambling businesses do not have direct account relationships
with U.S. financial institutions. "" Accordingly, at least "[i]n the case of incoming
cross-border ACH debit and check collection transactions, the proposed rule places
responsibility on the first participant in the United States that receives the incoming
transaction directly from a foreign institution ... to take reasonable steps to ensure
that [its] cross-border relationship is not used to facilitate restricted transactions. 55
In other systems, payments providers that do not have a direct relationship with a
gambling business are exempt.5 6 Last, the proposed rules request comment on the
desirability and feasibility of publishing a list of unlawful Internet gambling busi-
nesses, such as that administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC"),
to enable payments providers to block restricted transactions. 57
The agencies received more than 200 comments on the proposed regulations. 58
In its comment, for example, the Credit Union National Association called for a
moratorium on enforcement of the UIGEA until the scope of illegal conduct could
be better defined and the safe harbor could be enlarged.5 9 As of June 13, 2008,
there had been no further action on the proposed rules.
B. WTO COMPENSATION CLAIMS AND RETALIATORY ACTION
In answer to complaints Antigua and Barbuda filed in 2003 after the United
States prosecuted the operator of an online gambling site in Antigua, 60 the WTO
found that several U.S. federal and state statutes violated the "market access" rules
in Article XVI of the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") and were
not justified under GATS Article XIV(a) as "necessary to protect public morals or
to maintain public order.''61 Following an appeal, the WTO required the United
States to reform laws, primarily the Interstate Horseracing Act, to come into com-
pliance with GATS.62 On May 4, 2007, the United States announced it would
53. Id.
54. Id. at 56690.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. The agencies give detailed reasons for and against creation of such a list. For a summary of
the discussion of this proposal, see H. RP. No. 109-412, pt. 1, at 11 (2006).
58. See Fed. Reserve Bd., Comments on Prohibition of Funding of Unlawful Internet Gambling
[R-12981, http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/index.cfm?doc-id=R%2D 1298&doc-ver= 1
(last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
59. See Letter from Mary Michelle Dunn, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Credit Union
Nat'l Ass'n, to Jennifer J. Johnson, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & Dep't of the Treasury
(Dec. 12, 2007), http://www.cuna.org/reg__advocacy/commentletters/cl_121207.html ("Prohibition
of Funding on Unlawful Internet Gambling").
60. See United States v. Cohen, 260 E3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 922 (2002).
61. See Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Softens Earlier Condemnation of U.S. Bank on Internet Gambling, but
Confirms Broad Reach into Sensitive Domestic Regulation, A.S.I.L. INSIGHTS, Apr. 12, 2005, http://www.
asil.org/insights050412.cfm [hereinafter "Pauwelyn, WTO Softens"].
62. See id.
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withdraw its commitments to GATS on gambling services.63 Subsequently, a WTO
dispute resolution panel on May 22, 2007,64 allowed Antigua and Barbuda to "re-
taliate" for the United States' conduct. On June 22, 2007, Antigua requested sanc-
tions against the United States in the amount of $3.443 billion for lost gambling
revenues.65 Antigua also requested authority to suspend its commitments under
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS")
because the Antiguan economy was not large enough "to allow for effective sanc-
tions in the area of trade in services. "66
The United States responded with various proposals, including limiting Anti-
gua's damages to a figure corresponding to the percentage of gambling related to
horseracing-7 percent of the gambling market or $3.3 million in 2007-and
argued it was inappropriate to suspend Antigua's intellectual property obligations
under TRIPS. 67 On December 21, 2007, WTO arbitrators found, among other
things, that the annual impairment of benefits to Antigua from the U.S. action was
$21 million and Antigua could proceed with trying to suspend its TRIPS Agree-
ment responsibilities vis-A-vis the United States.' On January 28, 2008, Antigua
requested arbitration regarding the amount of compensation and the dispute has
now generated a firestorm of new compensation claims against the United States
by the European Union, Japan, Canada, Australia, India, Macau, and Costa Rica.
69
The United States and the European Union reached an agreement over their dis-
pute in December 2007,70 but the London-based Remote Gambling Association
continues to press for a more aggressive resolution. 71 Readers should continue
63. Id. (citing Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement of Deputy United
States Trade Representative John K. Veroneau Regarding U.S. Actions Under GATS Article XXXI (May 4,
2007), http ://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/Press-Releases/2007/May/StatementofDeputy-
UnitedStatesTradeRepresentativejohn KVeroneauRegardingUS ActionsunderGATS_
ArticleXXI.html). The United States decided to "[rewrite] its trade rules to remove Internet gambling
from the WTO'sjurisdiction." Josh Catone, US, EU Reach Internet Gambling Agreement, READWRITEWEB.
coM, Dec. 17, 2007, http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/us eu-reach-internet-gambling-agree
ment.php. For more discussion of the U.S. action, see Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Condemnation of U.S. Bank
on Internet Gambling Pits Free Trade Against Moral Values, A.S.I.L. INSIGHTS, Nov. 2004, http://www.asil.
org/insight04lll7.cfm; Pauwelyn, WTO Softens, supra note 61.
64. See 2007 Survey, supra note 3, at 268 n.247.
65. Id. For more analysis of this award, see Antigua Gambling Dispute: Major Economies Demand
Compensation from US, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEws DIGEST, July 4, 2007, http://ictsd.net/i/news/bridges
weekly/6527/ (citing Mark Mendel, Antigua's chief counsel, who describes his position that Antigua's
compensation claim was "conservative").
66. Simon Lester, The WTO Gambling Dispute: Antigua Mulls Retaliation as the U.S. Negotiates With-
drawal of Its GATS Commitments, 12 A.S.I.L. INSiGHTS--INT'L ECON. LAw EDITION, Apr. 8, 2008, http://
www.asil.org/insights/2008/04/insights080408.html.
67. See id.
68. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement on Internet Gambling (Dec. 21,
2007), http://wwwustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/Press_Releases/2007/December/Statement onInternet_
Gambling.html.
69. See Lester, supra note 66.
70. See, e.g., Press Release, European Comm'n, Trade Barriers Regulation: EU Opens Investigation
into US Internet Gambling Laws (Mar. 10, 2008), http://ec.europea.eu/trade/issues/respectsrules/tbr/
prl00308_en.htm.
71. See, e.g., Winter Casey, WTO Issues Decision on Internet Gambling Case, NATIONALJOURNAL.COM,
Dec. 21,2007, http://thegate.nationaljoumal.con/2007/12/wto-issuesdecision_oninterne.php; Press
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to follow these disputes because of their implications for electronic payments,
as well as for intellectual property rights and other obligations under GATS and
TRIPS.
C. A BANKRUPTCY COURT DECLARES THAT ILLEGAL
CREDIT CARD DEBTS INCURRED IN ONLINE GAMBLING
AFTER UIGEA EFFECTIVE DATE ARE UNENFORCEABLE
A very important development regarding UIGEA since our 2007 Survey pertains
to the enforceability of electronic payment obligations for online gambling. In In
re Baum, the court held that online gambling debts incurred after October 13,
2006, were unenforceable in bankruptcy if they violated the UIGEA.72 If the hold-
ing of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio stands, post-
October 13, 2006, debts for gambling obligations incurred in violation of the
UIGEA are unenforceable under federal law, just as pre-October 13, 2006, debts
for gambling obligations that violated state laws already were.
III. OTHER FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY
DEVELOPMENTS SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTING
THE OPERATION OF ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS
This part of the Survey covers the Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification
Act of 2007, regulations implementing the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions
Act, Federal Reserve Board action pertaining to Regulation E, e-disclosures, and
the E-Sign Act, and two recent FinCEN administrative rulings on the scope of
"money transmission."
A. FACT ACT RECEIPT TRUNCATION REQUIREMENTS
AND THE CREDIT AND DEBIT CARD RECEIPT
CLARIFICATION ACT OF 2007
The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act amended the Fair Credit Report-
ing Act ("FCRA") to, among other things, protect consumers from identity theft. 73
Section 113 of the FACT Act added a new subsection to section 605 of the FCRA
prohibiting a merchant from printing a receipt that contains more than the last five
digits of a credit or debit card number or the card's expiration date.74 The provision
also provides: "This subsection shall apply only to receipts that are electronically
printed, and shall not apply to transactions in which the sole means of recording
Release, Remote Gambling Ass'n, Gaming Industry Urges UK Government to join Fight Against Blatant
U.S. Protectionism (Oct. 30, 2007), http://www.rga.eu.com/shopping/images/Press%20Release%20-
%20EU-US%20Trade%20Dispute.pdf.
72. See In re Baum, 386 B.R. 649, 656, 659 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008).
73. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952, 1952
(preamble).
74. Id. § 113, 117 Stat. at 1959 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g) (2006)).
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a credit card or debit card account number is by handwriting or by an imprint or
copy of the card."
7 5
1. Scope of Damages for Receipt Truncation Violations
A consumer who establishes that a person acted negligently under 15 U.S.C.
section 1681c(g) may recover actual damages, as well as reasonable attorney's
fees and CoStS. 76 Furthermore, the consumer can recover for a willful violation
without having to prove actual damages.77 15 U.S.C. section 1681n(a) provides,
in relevant part:
Any person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed under
this subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount
equal to the sum of-
(1)(A) any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure or
damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000 .... 78
2. Receipt Truncation Lawsuits Against Merchants
Led to Passage of the Credit and Debit Card
Receipt Clarification Act of 2007
15 U.S.C. section 1681c(g) gained the attention of plaintiff class action law-
yers, and reports indicate that more than 300 complaints were filed under this
provision.79 On June 3, 2008, President Bush signed the Credit and Debit Card
Receipt Clarification Act of 2007 into law.80 As part of its findings in passing the
Act, Congress noted that merchants understood the truncation requirements set
forth in 15 U.S.C. section 1681c(g) to be "satisfied by truncating the account
number down to the last 5 digits based in part on the language of the provision
as well as the publicity in the aftermath of the passage of the law."'" Congress
further observed that "[a]lmost immediately after the deadline for compliance
passed, hundreds of lawsuits were filed alleging that the failure to remove the
expiration date was a willful violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act even
where the account number was properly truncated."'82 This new addition to the
75. Id.
76. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (2006).
77. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681n (West Supp. 2008).
78. Id.
79. Correy E. Stephenson, FACTA Litigation Heats Up, LAwYERsUSA, May 5, 2008, http://lawyersusa-
online.com/index.cfm/archive/view/id/430648; Posting of Dan Slater to Wall Street Journal Law Blog,
http://blogs.wsj. comAaw/2008/04/08/are-credit-card-receipt-class-actions-annihilating-corporate-
america (Apr. 8, 2008, 14:29 EST) ("Are Credit Card Receipt Class Actions Annihilating Corporate
America?"); Richard M. Hoffman, Justine Young Gottshall & Katherine K. Ivers, FACTA: Online Retail-
ers Beware-The New Class Action Threat, WILDMAN HARROLD CLIENT BULLETIN, Nov. 6, 2007, http://www.
wildman.con/index.cfm?fa=news.bulletin&aid=20780F4B-CDFC-74EC- 199080E8FB23E8BD.
80. Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-241, § 2(a)(3), 122
Stat. 1565.
81. Id.
82. Id. § 2(a)(4). Congress further acknowledged that "[nlone of these lawsuits contained an
allegation of harm to any consumer's identity," and "[eixperts in the field agree that proper truncation
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FCRA states that for purposes of determining willful noncompliance, "any person
who printed an expiration date on any receipt provided to a consumer card-
holder at a point of sale or transaction between December 4, 2004, and June 3,
2008, but otherwise complied with the requirements of section 1681c(g) of
this title for such receipt shall not be in willful noncompliance with section
1681c(g) by reason of printing such expiration date on the receipt. "s3 The Credit
and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act of 2007 contained further language in
which Congress expressly stated that the clarification applies retroactively to
pending lawsuits.
8 4
3. Courts Split on Application of 15 U.S.C.
Section 1681c(g) to Internet Transactions
A review of several district court decisions shows that uncertainty exists as to
whether 15 U.S.C. section 1681c(g) applies to a merchant doing business over
the Internet. This part of the Survey addresses Internet transactions, not those
done in person at "brick-and-mortar" locations.
The plaintiff in Grabein v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc., purchased flowers online
from the defendant ("1-800-Flowers").85 The plaintiff printed a confirmation of
an online order that included the expiration date of the plaintiff's credit card.8 6
1-800-Flowers moved to dismiss the case by arguing that 15 U.S.C. section
1681c(g) applies only to transactions where the seller, not the consumer, "prints"
the receipt for the consumer at the location of the transaction-for example,
an over-the-counter exchange of money for goods. 7 In addition, 1-800-Flowers
argued that Congress intended for the statute to cover only receipts printed at a
specific point of sale-like a retail establishment-and not receipts transmitted
electronically8 The plaintiff relied on Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary to
argue that "print" is defined as "'to display on a surface (as a computer screen) for
viewing."' 8 9 In finding against 1-800-Flowers, the court found that 1-800-Flowers
"mark[ed]" the plaintiff's computer screen "with printed characters" when 1-800-
Flowers transmitted an electronic receipt with the plaintiff's credit card expira-
tion date.9 0 The court further noted that "[e]liminating electronically transmitted
receipts from coverage of FACTA would undercut Congress's ability to stamp out
of the card number, by itself as required by the amendment made by the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act, regardless of the inclusion of the expiration date, prevents a potential fraudster from
perpetrating identity theft or credit card fraud." Id. § 2(a)(5), (6).
83. Id. § 3(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681n(d) (West Supp. 2008)).
84. See id. § 3(b). "The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to any action, other than an
action which has become final, that is brought for a violation of 605(g) of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act to which such amendment applies without regard to whether such action is brought before or after
the date of the enactment of this Act." Id.
85. No. 07-22235-CIV-HUCK, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11757, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2008).
86. Id.
87. Id. at *4.
88. Id.
89. Id. at *7-8 (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 924 (10th ed. 2002)).
Q0 Id at *8.
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identity theft in its various and rapidly changing forms, especially considering
the volume of transactions that now take place online." 91 However, as a result of
the enactment of the Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act of 2007, the
parties in the action stipulated to a notice of voluntary dismissal that rendered
moot their appeal pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit.
9 2
The court in King v. MovieTickets.com took the opposite view and held that
order receipts or confirmations provided over the Internet do not fall within the
scope of the FACT Act provision on credit card truncation.9 3 Edwin King ordered
movie tickets online from MovieTickets.com. 94 The receipt King received included
the expiration date of his credit card, and he alleged that including the expira-
tion date on his receipt was a violation of 15 U.S.C. section 1681c(g) 9 5 The U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted MovieTickets.com's
motion to dismiss.9 6 The court looked to the plain language of section 1681c(g),
consulted the dictionary, and reviewed the word "print" within the context of the
provision. 97 The court held that "it is clear that in the context of subsection (g)
and particularly in light of the 'cash register or other machine or device' language,
the word 'print' refers to the act of imprinting something on paper or another
tangible surface."98 The court went on to conclude that:
the term "print" must be construed in light of the use in § 1681c(g) of the word
"receipt" and the requirement that such receipts be "provided at the point of sale or
transaction." When § 1681c(g) is looked at as a whole, it is clear that this subsection
focuses on paper receipts electronically printed by a cash register or other machine
and provided to consumers at the point of sale or transaction."
The court specifically declined to follow the Vasquez and 1-800-Flowers courts
"because neither considered the plain meaning of the word 'printed,' within the
91. Id. at *9.
92. Stipulated Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Grabein v. 1-800-Flowers.com, No. CV 07-22235
(S.D. Fla. June 5, 2008). For other district court decisions allowing cases to proceed upon facts in
which a consumer printed a receipt or order confirmation from a purchase made over the Intemet,
see Harris v. Best Buy Co., Inc., No. 07 C 2559, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22166, at *24 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20,
2008); Harris v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. 07 C 2512, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12596, at *34 (N.D.
II1. Feb. 7, 2008); Vasquez-Torres v. Stubhub, Inc., No. CV 07-1328 PSG (SSx), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
63719, at * 10 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2007); Harris v. Wal-Mart Stores, No. 07-2561, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 10, 2007) (memorandum order and opinion).
93. King v. MovieTickets.com, No. 07-22119, slip op. at 14 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2008) ("Order
Granting Motion to Dismiss") [hereinafter "King Order"]. See also Narson v. GoDaddyCom, Inc., No.
08-0177, slip op. at 7 (D. Ariz. May 5, 2008) (order) (holding that the word "to print" is to transfer
information to a tangible medium); Haslam v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., No. 07-61871, slip op. at
7 (S.D. Fla. May 8, 2008) (holding that the word "print" commonly refers to a tangible, paper receipt
and not an on-screen computer display).
94. King Order, supra note 93, at 2.
95. Id. at 2-3.
96. Id. at 14.
97. Id. at 8-9.
98. Id. at 10.
99. Id.
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context of the entire § 1681c(g)." °° The court also stated that in cases where the
consumer printed the paper copy of the e-mail, the paper copy was not provided
by the merchant. 10 1 The court noted that "[tihe plain language of the statute ex-
pressly requires that the person accepting such credit cards be the party both
printing and providing the receipt."'12 After the court dismissed his action, King
filed an amended complaint but that action was also dismissed by the court. 13
B. REGULATION E, ELECTRONIC DISCLOSURES,
AND THE E-SIGN ACT
In the 2007 Survey, we discussed an amendment to Regulation E to exempt
issuers in low-dollar debit card transactions of $15 or less from Regulation E's
paper receipt requirements.10 4 In the only Regulation E development since the
2007 Survey, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ("Board") on
November 9, 2007, adopted a final rule to clarify the requirements for providing
consumer disclosures in electronic form under Regulation E.105 This final rule
withdrew parts of an interim final rule for the electronic delivery of disclosures
issued March 30, 2001.106 The interim final rule restated or cross-referenced the
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act ("E-Sign Act") regard-
ing electronic disclosures and electronic signatures, and that rule was unnecessary
because the E-Sign Act is a self-effectuating statute. 07 The Board also withdrew
provisions related to the specific timing and delivery requirements for electronic
disclosures under Regulation E, such as the requirement to send disclosures to a
consumer's e-mail address or post the disclosures on a web site and send a notice
alerting the consumer to the disclosures. 18 In issuing the final rule, the Board re-
considered disclosure by e-mail because electronic disclosures have evolved since
2001 as industry and consumers have gained experience with them, and concerns
exist related to e-mail due to data security, identity theft, and phishing. 0 9
C. FINCEN'S 2008 ADMINISTRATIVE RULINGS ON "MONEY
TRANSMISSION"-ONE PROGRAM IS, THE OTHER IS NOT
In March and May 2008, respectively, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Finan-
cial Crimes Enforcement Network-colloquially known as "FinCEN"-announced
100. Id. at 11.
101. Id. at 12.
102. Id.
103. King v. MovieTickets.com, No. 07-22119, slip op. at 8 (S.D. Fla. May 19, 2008) ("Order
Granting Motion to Dismiss; Dismissing Case with Prejudice; Closing Case").
104. See 2007 Survey, supra note 3, at 265-66.
105. Electronic Fund Transfer, 72 Fed. Reg. 63452 (Nov. 9, 2007) (to be codified at 12 C.ER.
pt. 205).
106. Id. at 63452.
107. Id. at 63453.
108. Id. at 63454.
109. Id.
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administrative rulings on the scope of the term "money transmission" and its effect
on who qualifies as a "money services business" for purposes of compliance obliga-
tions under the Bank Secrecy Act.
FinCEN regulations implementing provisions of the anti-money laundering
laws require that "money services businesses" register with FinCEN. FinCEN de-
fines the term "money services business" to include, among others, persons doing
business as a seller or redeemer of stored value or as a money transmitter. 110
Thus, persons serving as "money transmitters," which FinCEN defines as "any
person ... who engages as a business in accepting currency, or funds denominated
in currency, and transmits the currency or funds or the value of currency or funds,
by any means through a financial agency or institution,""' are "money services
businesses" and must register with FinCEN and comply with its Bank Secrecy Act
regulations." 2
1. Is Offering a One-Time-Only, Virtual Replacement
Credit Card "Money Transmission"?
FinCEN's first ruling answers a question from a limited liability company about
whether offering a one-time-only virtual replacement credit card with a credit
limit equal to the full price of goods or services involved in a single online transac-
tion constitutes "money transmission." Each "virtual card" expires upon use and
cannot be reloaded."' FinCEN determined that the answer is "yes-the issuer
qualifies as a "money transmitter"114 and, accordingly, has to register with FinCEN
as a "money services business."'15
To use this virtual credit card, consumers have to provide personal financial
information. 116 They also choose whether to bill funds loaded onto the card to an
existing credit or debit card, or to authorize an ACH debit from a bank account."I7
To obtain the specific virtual card, the consumer accesses the virtual card issuer's
web site and enters the amount of the purchase." 8 The "card" issues after the
pre-authorization comes through or the debit is "processed satisfactorily" and the
issuer has instructed its U.S. partner bank to issue the card to the consumer." 9
A key feature of the card is the issuer's commitment to protect the identity and
financial account information of the consumer involved, 120 in much the same way
110. 31 C.FR. § 103.11(uu) (2007) (definition of "money service business").
111. Id. § 103.11(uu)(5)(i)(A).
112. Id. pt. 103.
113. Whether a Certain Operation Protecting On-line Personal Financial Information Is a Money
Transmitter, FIN-2008-R007 (May 27, 2008), http://wwwfincen.gov/statutes.regs/guidance/html/
fin-2008-r007.html thereinafter "FIN-2008-R007"].
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id.
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that PayPal does.' 2' The issuer's "partner bank" handles debiting the issuer's ac-
count and paying the online merchant, and the issuer is protected from any credit
risk in the transaction. 122 Nevertheless, FinCEN concluded that the issuer is re-
quired to register with FinCEN as a "money services business."' 23 Additionally, the
issuer also will have to comply with state regulations and licensing requirements
for a "money services business. "124
PayPal, whose payments platform also protects the identity and financial ac-
count information of a consumer unless the consumer discloses its name and
address to the person to whom the on-line purchase is provided, is registered as
a "money services business" with FinCEN'25 and also has "money transmitter"
or "money services business" licenses in many jurisdictions. 2 6 To hold that this
limited liability company requesting FinCEN's guidance was not a "money trans-
mitter" would have required some rethinking of the earlier insistence of FinCEN
and some states that PayPal was a "money transmitter."'27 However, there is an
unanswered question of whether the contemporary virtual credit card offered by
Visa and MasterCard' also involves "money transmission."
2. Is a Reloadable Prepaid Card Program "Money
Transmission" or the "Sale of Stored Value"?
FinCEN concluded in its March 10, 2008, ruling that a prepaid card reload
program offered by 5,700 depositary institutions through merchants and retail
operators of automated teller machines ("ATMs") is not "money transmission" or
the "sale of stored value."'129 Participants in this service, therefore, are not "money
services businesses."' 30 The provider group has 140 million cards in circulation;
holders can use cards at more than 1.9 million ATM and point-of-sale locations.13'
Customers can withdraw cash, make purchases, check account balances, and do
other transactions at ATMs and merchant point-of-sale locations sponsored by
121. See PayPal, Privacy to Fight Identity Theft, https://www.paypal.com/us/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=
xpt/cps/securitycenter/buy/Privacy-outside (last visited June 17, 2008).
122. FIN-2008-R007, supra note 113.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.230.05-19.230.905 (West 2007); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 6.1-370-6.1-378.4 (West 1999 & Supp. 2008).
125. See FinCEN, MSB State Selector, http://www.msb.gov/guidance/msbstateselector.php (last
visited Sept. 28, 2008) (California).
126. See PayPal, State Licenses, https://www.paypal.com/us/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=p/ir/licenses-out
side (last visitedJune 17, 2008).
127. See id.
128. See, e.g., Posting of Janet Meiners to WebProNews, http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/
2007/11/19/paypal-unveils-virtual-credit-card (Nov. 19, 2007, 17:09 EST), ("PayPal Unveils Virtual
Credit Card"); http://www.Illcard.com/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
129. Whether Certain Reloadable Card Operations Are Money Services Businesses,
FIN-2008-R-005, at 1 (Mar. 10, 2008), available at http://www.fincen.gov/statutes-regs/guidance/pdf/
fin-2008-r005.pdf.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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bank members of this consortium. 112 Members that sponsor ATMs and merchants
are "fully responsible for the transactions" at those terminals as if they "owned and
operated them."133 Following verification, the depositary institution provider sig-
nals approval of the reload to the merchant or ATM and the intermediary credits
the card after any fee charged is deducted. 1
3 4
Cardholders can add value in one of three ways: through in-branch payments,
ACH direct deposits, or receipt of transfers of value by competing reload networks.
The provider plans to expand to handle the reload value transfers themselves.'35
Plans for expanding services involve the forwarding of funds collected by the ATM
or merchant to the provider and verification by the provider of the good standing
of the account underlying the prepaid card and the customer's management of the
account. 
136
Six factors appear to have influenced FinCEN's ruling. In addition to the three
mentioned above-the above-described verification process, use of the intermedi-
ary, and assignment of the risk to the provider,13 FinCEN also emphasized that
the "money transmitter" definition provides that "'the acceptance and transmis-
sion of funds as an integral part of the execution and settlement of a transaction
other than the funds transmission itself... will not cause a person to be a money
transmitter. "'118 The last two factors were that the provider's members are banks
who control how their ATMs and sponsored merchants add value, 39 and that the
ATMs and sponsored merchants operate "only as a conduit" between the mem-
ber bank and the member customers. 140 Because of their limited roles in the re-
load transactions, the sponsored merchants and ATMs did not qualify as sellers of
stored value.14 ' Given the central role that banks play in this particular reloading
operation, it is unclear whether non-bank providers of reloadable prepaid cards
would have received a similarly favorable response from FinCEN.
IV. DATA SECURITY: CONSUMERS PURSUE CLASS
ACTIONS AS BREACHES CONTINUE
Since our 2007 Survey, new data security breaches have occurred in the United
States, including at the Hannaford Brothers grocery store chain 42 and at smaller
retailers, such as Dave & Buster's, a national restaurant chain. 43 There has been
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2.
138. Id. (quoting 31 C.FR. § 103.11(uu)(5)(ii) (2008) (emphasis added)) (omission in original).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 3.
142. See infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
143. See Superseding Indictment at 3-5, United States v. Yastremskiy, No. 08-CR-160 (S-1) (SJF)
(E.D.N.Y. May 14, 2008). The indictment charged that hackers installed electronic collection software
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class action litigation against Hannaford Brothers 144 and settlement of a Federal
Trade Commission action against TJX Companies, Inc., the parent of TJMaxx,
pertaining to its sizeable security breach.1
4
On March 17, 2008, Hannaford Brothers, a Maine-based grocery store chain,
announced that "data intrusion into [our] computer network ... resulted in the
theft of consumer credit and debit card numbers.' 1 46 4.2 million credit and debit
card numbers apparently were compromised in the breach and 1,800 cases of
reported credit and debit card fraud allegedly have arisen. t47 Although Hannaford
Brothers confirmed that its security systems had been deemed PCI-compliant in
February 2008,148 it still faces class action litigation by customers as well as the
costs of remediating customer and bank losses associated with the breach. 49
Congress is considering numerous proposals for notice and remediation of data
security breaches15 0 -at least one, H.R. 4175, was first introduced after our 2007
Survey. In addition, on June 10, 2008, Governor M. Jodi Rell of Connecticut
signed into law SB 5658, which subjects individuals to civil fines up to $500,000
for an "intentional failure" to safeguard personal information whether in paper or
electronic form. 
1S1
onto cash-register systems in order to steal debit and credit card data during payment authorization.
See id. The defendants allegedly hacked into data while cash registers were processing authorizations.
See id.
144. Trevor Maxwell, Lawyers Vie to Lead Suit over Breach: Hannaford Likely Will Face One Class-
Action Lawsuit over the Exposure of Customers' Data, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, June 2, 2008, at Al.
145. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Agency Announces Settlement of Separate Actions Against
Retailer TJX, and Data Brokers Reed Elsevier and Seisint for Failing to Provide Adequate Security for
Consumers' Data (Mar. 27, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/03/datasec.shtm.
146. See Consumers of Hannaford Brothers Co. Supermarkets File Class Action Suit for Loss of Credit
Card and Debit Card Data, PR NEwsWvRE, Mar. 19, 2008 (online) (internal quotation marks omitted).
147. Id. Reports suggest that the breach began in early December 2007 and was not contained
until March 10, 2008; Hannaford Brothers admits it knew of the breach by late February 2008. See id.
Apparently, hackers installed malware on the Hannaford Brothers cash registers and stole credit and
debit card information along with approval codes. They then manufactured cards using that informa-
tion and successfully used those cards in transactions in the original consumers' names with other
merchants. The data breach was revealed when consumers started reporting unauthorized debits from
bank accounts and unauthorized credit card charges. See, e.g., Ross Kerber, Advanced Tactic Targeted
Grocer: "Malware" Stole Hannaford Data, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 28, 2008, at 1A.
148. See, e.g., Michael Garry, Retailers Callfor More Flexible, Secure POS, SUPERMARKET NEws, May 19,
2008, at 35; Christina Veiders, Standards Not Enough in Hannaford Brothers Data Breach, SUPERMARKET
NEws, Apr. 14, 2008, at 12.
149. See. e.g., Press Release, Berger & Montague, PC., Consumers of Hannaford Brothers Co. Su-
permarkets File Class Action Suit for Loss of Credit Card and Debit Card Data (Mar. 19, 2008),
http://www.bergermontague.com/case-summarycfm?id=178. Other entities had sizeable data secu-
rity breaches during the past year. See, e.g., Robert Lemos, Bank of NY Mellon Breaches Keep Growing,
SECUR1TYFocus, Mar. 9, 2008, http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/811; Linda McGlasson, Bank of New
York Mellon Investigated for Lost Data Tape, BANK INFO SECURITY, May 27, 2008, http://www.bankinfos-
ecurity.com/articles.php?art-id=862.
150. See, e.g., Piracy and Cybercrime Enforcement Act of 2007, H.R. 4175, 110th Cong. (2007);
Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 958, 1 10th Cong. (2007); Notification of Risk to Personal
Data Act of 2007, S. 239, 110th Cong. (2007).
151. M. Peter Adler, Pepper Hamilton LLP, New Connecticut Data Protection Law Imposes a Maximum
Fine of $500,000 for Willful Violations, PRIVACY & SECURITY CLIENT ALERT, June 19, 2008, http://www.
pepperlaw.com/pepper/publications-update.cfm?rid= 1449.0.
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V. OTHER SIGNIFICANT FEDERAL LEGISLATION-THE CREDIT
CARD FAIR FEE ACT OF 2008
A. BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
On March 6, 2008, Rep. John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI), introduced the Credit Card
Fair Fee Act of 2008 into the U.S. House of Representatives. 52 The stated purpose
of the bill is "to ensure competitive market-based rates and terms for merchants'
access to electronic payment systems."' 3 Conyers is Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee and also heads the Antitrust Task Force and Competition Policy Sub-
committee, to which the bill was referred.15 4 The bill creates an exemption to cur-
rent antitrust laws to allow groups of merchants to band together to negotiate
interchange rates with Visa and MasterCard.' 5 If, after a period of negotiations,
they cannot reach agreement, the matter is referred to a panel of Electronic Pay-
ment System Judges ("EPSJ"). Each side presents its best proposal for rates and fees
to the judges who are required to pick one of the two plans which becomes binding
on the participants for the next three years. 5 6 According to Chairman Conyers:
This legislation is intended to give merchants a seat at the table in the determination
of these fees. It is not an attempt at regulating the industry and does not mandate any
particular outcome. This legislation simply enhances competition by allowing mer-
chants to negotiate with the dominant banks for the terms and rates of the fees.'57
The bill received bipartisan support in the House, attracting forty-five cospon-
sors with a fairly even split between parties.158 The proposal has its opponents also,
including Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) who said, "This is a very ill-advised
bill. It is going to have a lot of unintended consequences. " 15 9 Rep. Lamar Smith
(R-TX) focused his concerns on the effect of the legislation on consumers. He
asked, "Will the consumer pay less in goods and services if the interchange fees
are reduced for merchants? Will those lower prices be offset by reduced credit
card benefits and higher charges and fees on credit cards?"'
The Antitrust Task Force of the House Judiciary Committee held hearings on
the bill on May 15, 2008.161 Stephen Cannon testified in favor of the bill on
152. Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008, H.R. 5546, 110th Cong. (2008) [hereinafter "H.R. 5546"].
153. Id. (preamble).
154. See U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, http://judiciary.house.gov/
(last visited Oct. 24, 2008) (regarding Chairman Conyers); U.S. House of Representatives, Committee
on the Judiciary, Antitrust Task Force and Competition Policy Subcommittee, http://judiciary.house.
gov/about/subantitrust.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
155. H.R. 5546, supra note 152, § 2(c).
156. Id. § 2(d)(2)(A).
157. 154 Cong. Rec. E318, E319 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 2008) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
158. See Library of Congress, Thomas, Bills, Resolutions, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?dl lO:h.r.05546: (last visited Sept. 21, 2008).
159. Cheyene Hopkins, Lawmaker Views Color Palette on Interchange Bill, AM. BANKER, May 16, 2008,
at 3, 3.
160. Id.
161. Hearing on H.R. 5546, The "Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008," Before the Antitrust Task Force
and Competition Policy Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (May 15, 2008), avail-
able at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_051508.html [hereinafter "Credit Card Hearing"].
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behalf of the Merchants Payment Coalition, a coalition of twenty-three trade as-
sociations representing retailers, restaurants, supermarkets, convenience stores,
gasoline stations, and other merchants who accept debit and credit cards for
payment. 6 2 Cannon testified that because Visa and MasterCard control approxi-
mately 75 percent of all card payment transactions, merchants have no choice
but to accept their cards.'63 By accepting the cards, merchants must abide by the
card association rules and pay the interchange fees which are set not through a
competitive process but rather unilaterally by the banks that are members of the
card associations. 16 Cannon stated that interchange rates are seven times the
actual cost of processing a payment and, as a result, American consumers indi-
rectly paid $42 billion in interchange fees in 2007.65 The Merchants Payment
Coalition supports the bill because it would foster negotiations and voluntary
agreements and would impose judicially determined solutions only when nego-
tiations fail. 166
Representatives from both Visa and MasterCard testified against the bill, as-
serting that ultimately the legislation would increase costs for retailers. Joshua
Floum, General Counsel for Visa Inc., explained that a payment card system is an
example of a "two-sided market," or one in which there are two distinct groups of
customers and the level of participation within one group determines the value of
the product to the other. He testified:
The demand for payment cards by cardholders and retailers is interdependent-the
greater the number of consumers who use payment cards, the more valuable the
network is to retailers, and the greater the number of retailers that accept payment
cards, the more cardholders value those cards. Payment networks use interchange to
balance demand between the two sides of the market, promoting growth of the total
system. 167
Visa contended that it sets interchange rates with an understanding of this two-
sided market and a goal of maximizing transaction volume. 16 8 If interchange is
not sufficient to provide cardholders with rewards programs and other benefits,
they switch to other payment card brands that offer them a better deal. 169 Like-
wise, if Visa interchange rates are set at too high a rate, then retailers will stop
accepting Visa cards or will exhibit less preference for Visa products. 7 ' Given
162. Id. (statement of W Stephen Cannon, Chairman, Constantine Cannon, LLP, on behalf of the
Merchant Payments Coalition).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. (statement of Joshua Floum, General Counsel, Visa Inc.). For a more detailed explana-
tion of payment card systems as a two-sided market, see Stuart E. Weiner & Julian Wright, Inter-
change Fees in Various Countries: Developments and Determinants, 4 REv. NETWORK ECON. 290, 292-93
(2005).
168. Credit Card Hearing, supra note 161 (statement of Joshua Floum, General Counsel, Visa Inc.).
169. Id.
170. Id.
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that both the number of Visa cards issued and the number of retailers that accept
the brand have increased significantly over the last decade, Visa asserts that it
has succeeded in setting interchange rates at an optimal rate and there is no need
for change.
17 1
Joshua Peirez, a senior officer from MasterCard, questioned whether the goal
of the merchants backing this legislation was really to win the opportunity to
negotiate payment card fees, or to force a reduction in such fees through gov-
ernment regulation.'72 He noted that merchants who wish to accept American
Express payment cards currently negotiate the discount fees they pay to American
Express:
Yet the merchant discount fees that merchants agree to pay when they choose to
accept American Express cards are higher on average than the fees they pay when
they choose to accept MasterCard cards .... [I] f merchants are willing to pay more for
American Express when they readily admit that they do not have to accept the Ameri-
can Express card, how can they claim that our system which involves interchange fees
and results in average merchant discount fees that are lower raises an issue that must
be addressed by Congress. 173
From the card associations' perspective, their interchange rates are optimized to
benefit both merchants and consumers as is demonstrated by the wide and grow-
ing acceptance of the Mastercard and Visa brands by both constituencies."'
On June 5, 2008, Senator Richard J. Durbin introduced a companion bill in
the Senate and stated that "[hiigher interchange fees for businesses means higher
costs for retailers and consumers." 175 Durbin asserted that "[e]very time you make
a purchase with plastic, the bank that issued your credit card gets a cut of the sale
amount. American businesses and consumers are getting nickled and dimed by
the big banks, who end up making billions from these hidden fees."17 6 The Senate
bill, also named the Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008, is substantively quite simi-
lar to the House version, but the Senate restructured, expanded, and reworded
171. Id.
172. Id. (statement of Joshua Peirez, Chief Payment System Integrity Officer, MasterCard Worldwide).
173. Id.
174. The interchange issue has received significant attention in the business press, beginning with
an editorial in the Wall StreetJournal which said the bill's administrative process "sounds like a price-
control regime." Editorial, Credit-Card Wars, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2008, at A8. The editorial went on
to state that a strong case could be made that Visa and MasterCard attained their market share and
profitability by offering a superior product and no one "should want the precedent of punishing a
business for winning huge numbers of voluntary customers by outcompeting rivals." Id. Representa-
tives John Conyers, Jr., and Chris Cannon, sponsors of the bill, responded with a letter noting that
Americans pay on average three times the amount in interchange fees as Europeans do and concluded
that market forces would not correct this inequity "unless there are negotiations and proceedings as set
forth in our legislation." John Conyers, Jr. & Chris Cannon, The Credit-Card Fee Market Isn't Working,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2008, at A18.
175. Press Release, U.S. Sen. Dick Durbin, Durbin Moves to Bring Down Credit Card Costs (June 5,
2008), http://durbin.senate.gov/showRelease.cfm?releaseld=298800.
176. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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certain provisions of the House Bill.' 77 As was the case in the House, because
the bill ostensibly deals with an antitrust issue, it was assigned to the Judiciary
Committee.'78
B. AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATION
The Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008 79 creates an exemption to current anti-
trust law to allow merchants' 80 and providers of a "covered electronic payment
system"' "8 to negotiate and agree upon the terms and fees for access to the sys-
tem's payment products.8 2 The only networks that currently meet the market
share requirement of "covered electronic payment system" are Visa and Master-
Card.'83 If the distribution of market share were to change, however, other pay-
ment networks could come under the bill's jurisdiction and Visa or MasterCard
could drop out.
Interestingly, the bill never uses the term "interchange" but rather asserts
"[alccess by a merchant to any covered electronic payment system and the fees
and terms of such access shall be subject to this Act.' 8s4 "Access" is defined
as permission to conduct transactions-including authorization, clearance, and
settlement-involving the acceptance of credit or debit cards from consumers
for the payment for goods or services and the receipt of payment for such goods
177. See Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008, S. 3086, 110th Cong. (2008), available at http://www.
govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s1 10-3086 [hereinafter "S. 3086"]. Because the Senate version
of the bill is more detailed, we refer to it when discussing the terms of the legislation.
178. 154 CONG. REc. S5208 (daily ed. June 5, 2008) (statement of Sen. Durbin).
179. The legislation's title-Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008-is a bit of a misnomer because the
bill covers fees for accepting debit as well as credit cards.
180. "Merchant" refers to "any person who accepts or seeks to accept debit or credit cards in pay-
ment for goods and services." S. 3086, supra note 177, § 2(a)(19).
181. "Covered electronic payment system" is defined as "an electronic payment system that routes
information and data to facilitate transaction authorization, clearance, and settlement for not less
than 20 percent of the combined dollar value of credit card and debit card payments processed in the
United States in the most recent full calendar year." Id. § 2(a)(10).
182. See id. § 2(c)(1). The specific terms of the exemption read:
Notwithstanding any provision of the antitrust laws-
(1) in negotiating fees and terms and participating in any proceedings under subsection (d),
any providers of a covered electronic payment system and any merchants who have access
to or who are seeking access to that covered electronic payment system may jointly negoti-
ate and agree upon the fees and terms for access to the covered electronic payment system,
including through the use of common agents that represent the providers of the covered
electronic payment system or the merchants on a nonexclusive basis; and
(2) any providers of a single covered electronic payment system also may jointly determine the
proportionate division among such providers of paid fees.
Id. § 2(c).
183. Editorial, Credit-Card Wars, supra note 174, at A8 (stating that Visa has approximately 50 per-
cent of the credit and debit card market while MasterCard controls approximately 25 percent).
184. S. 3086, supra note 177, § 2(b).
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or services." 5 "Credit card" refers to a general purpose card or other device is-
sued or approved by a financial institution that allows the cardholder to obtain
goods or services on credit terms specified by the financial institution."6 The bill
defines "debit card" to mean a card or device "approved for use by a financial
institution for use in debiting the account of a cardholder for the purpose of that
cardholder obtaining goods or services, whether authorization is signature-based
or PIN-based.'
18 7
In its operative sections, the bill immunizes merchants and covered electronic
payment system providers from any liability under the antitrust laws that might
arise from negotiations or other proceedings which are authorized by the Act.'
Protected under the bill is the voluntary negotiation of an access agreement be-
tween one or more providers of a covered electronic payment system and one or
more merchants.189 If the parties reach an agreement, they are required to file a
copy with a court of specially created EPSJs 190 who will then make the document
publicly available.' 9' If the parties cannot reach a mutually acceptable agreement,
mandatory "proceedings" are to begin before the EPSJs, including a three-month
period of negotiation between the parties. 192 If voluntary negotiations fail, it ap-
pears that the Act mandates that the EPSJs set the interchange fees and terms.'93
VI. FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
Since our 2007 Survey, federal bank regulatory agencies and the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") have brought enforcement actions seeking sizeable mon-
etary damages from companies for engaging in "unsafe and unsound practices"
under the federal banking statutes 194 or in "unfair or deceptive acts or practices"
in violation of section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 19 These actions
185. Id. § 2(a)(1).
186. Id. § 2(a)(11).
187. Id. § 2(a)(12). Under this definition, a number of payroll cards and other prepaid debit prod-
ucts are not covered by the bill. Most payroll and prepaid debit card programs do not provide for a
separate bank account for each cardholder, but rather place all of the funds backing the cards in a
single "funds pool" typically held in the name of the employer or program sponsor. For a more detailed
explanation, see 2006 Survey, supra note 31, at 232. Because the use of such cards does not involve
"debiting the account of a cardholder," these cards do not qualify as debit cards for purposes of the
legislation.
188. S. 3086, supra note 177, § 2(c).
189. Id. § 2(d)(1)(A).
190. Section 3 of the bill details the process for the selection and appointment of EPSJs and sets
forth their powers and duties. Id. § 3.
191. Id. § 2(d)(1)(B), (C).
192. See id. §§ 2(d)(2), (3) & 4(b)(2)(A), (B).
193. Id. Section 2(d)(3) states that the EPSJs "shall conduct proceedings under this Act to establish
fees and terms for access to a covered electronic payment system." Section 5(a)(1) of the bill, titled
"Institution of Proceedings Before Electronic Payment System Judges," does not address who may initi-
ate a proceeding, but rather simply says "[piroceedings under this Act shall be commenced as soon as
practicable after the date of enactment."
194. See infra Part VIA.1.
195. See infra Part VI.A.2.
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include the April 2008 settlement of allegations of unsound practices brought by
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") against Wachovia Bank,
N.A., as well as the June 2008 actions by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration ("FDIC") against three banks for engaging in "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices" related to marketing subprime credit cards and against CompuCredit
Corporation under the FDIC's "institution-affiliated party" authority.116 Collec-
tively, these enforcement actions seek more than $150 million in restitution, size-
able additional payments for consumer education and compliance programs, and
civil penalties. They also signal a move toward increased government oversight of
the third-party partners with whom financial services providers work.
In our 2007 Survey we reported on developments in the federal prosecution of
e-gold Ltd. for failing to register as a "money services business" or comply with
certain Bank Secrecy Act requirements. 197 Since then, the defendants in this prose-
cution challenged the application of the Bank Secrecy Act to their operations. The
U.S. District Court ruled against e-gold and the defendants have subsequently
entered into plea agreements.
A. FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS UNDER THE GOVERNMENT'S
AUTHORITY TO REGULATE "UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES"
AND "UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES"
1. Bank Regulators Use Their Authority
a. The OCC Gets $144 Million from Wachovia
In the 2007 Survey, we discussed the DOJs prosecution of Payments Process-
ing Center, LLC, which processed "remotely created checks" payable to certain
telemarketers through commercial banks. 19 8 Since then, the 0CC settled charges
against Wachovia Bank, N.A., that Wachovia had engaged in various "unsafe and
unsound" banking practices in managing its account relationship with Payments
Processing Center.199 Among its findings, the OCC concluded that Wachovia:
* "failed to conduct suitable due diligence on the [Payments Processors']
accounts even though Wachovia had reason to know that their payments
processor and direct telemarketers ... posed significant legal, reputational
and monetary risks to the Bank and monetary risk to consumers; "200
* "fail! ed] to recognize and properly address the risks posed by the activities of
the [non-bank] payments processors and direct telemarketers" who generate
remotely created checks ("RCCs") which Wachovia accepts for deposit;2 1
196. See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u) (2006).
197. See 2007 Survey, supra note 3, at 254-62.
198. See id. at 263-65. As explained in last year's Survey, Professor Hughes briefly served as an
expert in the criminal case against Payments Processing Center, LLC. See id. at 264 n.220.
199. In re Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 2008-027 (OCC Apr. 24, 2008) ("Consent Order for a Civil
Monetary Penalty"), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-48a.pdf.
200. Id. at 2.
201. Id.
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" "fail[ed] to monitor the rates of [charge-backs] on the RCCs deposited into
the accounts and to respond to allegations of consumer fraud from other
banks and consumers";02 and
" "fail[ed] to follow the Bank's normal procedures for handling returned
RCCs" and to create procedures to "minimize consumer complaints and
scrutiny of the Bank's relationships with the payments processors and di-
rect telemarketers."
20 3
The settlement requires the payment by Wachovia Bank of roughly $144 million.
The breakdown of this sum is a $10 million civil penalty,2 4 $125 million in resti-
tution to consumers,2 °5 and $8.9 million for consumer education programs.2 6
Wachovia also is named in a civil action filed in Pennsylvania in which the
plaintiff alleges that the bank knowingly processed fraudulent checks and unau-
thorized demand drafts for telemarketing companies.
20 7
b. The FDIC Sues Banks and CompuCredit Corporation
As the subprime mortgage crisis hit in 2007, Chairman Barney Frank of the
House Financial Services Committee warned bank regulators that they should use
their statutory "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" authority under section 5(a)
of the Federal Trade Commission Act 2 8-or risk losing it.20 9 After Chairman
Frank's plea, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System proposed regu-
lations of unfair or deceptive acts or practices. 2 0 At the same time, the Board pro-
posed similar revisions to Regulation Z2
1 and Regulation DD.212
202. Id. at 3.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Agreement by and Between Wachovia Bank, National Association, Charlotte, North Carolina,
and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency at 4, In re Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 2008-027 (OCC
Apr. 24, 2008), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-48b.pdf [hereinafter "Wachovia
Agreement"]. Restitution will be paid to consumers who file an appropriate claim in United States v.
Payments Processing Center, LLC, No. 06-725 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2006) (filing of amended verified
complaint). The settlement has been criticized by Rep. Markey (D-MA) and others for not providing a
simpler method for consumers to get their money back. See Charles Duhigg, Big Fine Setfor Wachovia
to End Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2008, at Cl.
206. Wachovia Agreement, supra note 205, at 8.
207. See Complaint/Class Action at 19-21, Faloney v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 07-1455 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 12, 2007).
208. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006).
209. See Jesse Westbrook & Craig Torres, U.S. Regulators Tell Lenders to Toughen Standards,
BLOOMBERG.COM, June 29, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aM7SRh
UR34Sg (commenting on how U.S. banking regulators were telling mortgage lenders to tighten their
standards in extending credit on subprime loans, and how Chairman Frank and others thought that
regulators were shirking their rulemaking authority with regard to subprime loans).
210. Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, 73 Fed. Reg. 28904 (proposed May 19, 2008) (to be
codified at 12 C.ER. pts. 227, 535 & 706) (joint proposal of the Federal Reserve System, Office of
Thrift Supervision, and the National Credit Union Administration).
211. Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 28866 (proposed May 19, 2008) (to codified at 12 C.ER.
pt. 226).
212. Truth in Savings, 73 Fed. Reg. 28739 (proposed May 19, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.ER.
pt. 230).
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On June 10, 2008, the FDIC announced it was seeking $200 million from First
Bank of Delaware, First Bank & Trust of Brookings, South Dakota, and Compu-
Credit Corporation for engaging in deceptive marketing of Visa and MasterCard
branded credit card products to consumers with low credit scores. 21 3 While each
of the targets engaged in different marketing practices, the FDIC faulted each for
failure to "disclose significant upfront fees. '2 14 For example, the FDIC charged that
First Bank & Trust offered a credit card with "up to $3250" in available credit to
some consumers, but failed to tell applicants that only half of the credit limit would
be available for the first ninety days.2 15 Similarly, CompuCredit allegedly failed to
disclose that it would monitor cardholders' purchases and reduce available credit
based on undisclosed "behavioral" scoring models.2 16 In other cases, CompuCredit
offered consumers a Visa credit card to which they could transfer charged-off debt
which would then be reported to consumer credit reporting agencies as hav-
ing been paid in full.2 17 In fact, CompuCredit enrolled some of those consumers
in a debt repayment plan operated by its subsidiary, Jefferson Capital, and did
not issue the promised credit card until the consumer had repaid 25 percent to
50 percent of the charged-off debt. 218 Also, consumers who paid the sums required
discovered that their Visa cards had only nominal available credit limits.
2 1 9
The FDIC settled similar charges involving CompuCredit with a third financial
institution, Columbus Bank, which had agreed to a cease-and-desist order,2 ° a
$2.4 million civil penalty, and to maintain a fund of $7.5 million to guarantee
payment of the restitution that the FDIC is seeking from CompuCredit. 2 ' The
cease-and-desist order requires that all future card solicitations contain clear and
"prominent" upfront disclosures of all fees and restrictions on the cardholder's ini-
tial available credit, prohibits material misrepresentations related to credit cards,
and requires maintenance of adequate systems and controls especially for supervi-
sion of third-party partners.
222
213. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Seeks in Excess of $200 Million Against Credit Card
Company and Two Banks for Deceptive Credit Card Marketing (June 10, 2008) (PR-47-2008), available
at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08047.html [hereinafter "FDIC Press Release"].
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. In re Columbus Bank & Trust Co., FDIC-08-033b, FDIC-08-034k (June 9, 2008) ("Order to
Cease and Desist and Order to Pay"), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/CBT-
CDandOrderto_Paypdf [hereinafter "Cease-and-Desist-Order"].
221. In re Columbus Bank & Trust Co., FDIC-08-033b, FDIC-08-034k, slip op. at 2 (June 9,
2008) ("Order for Restitution"), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/CBTResti
tution Order.pdf.
The bank's obligation to pay restitution is contingent on the success of the FDIC's litigation against
CompuCredit and apparently is intended to fund cash refunds for consumers in the event Compu-
Credit is unable to do so. See id. at 2-3. The bank also agreed to cooperate with the FDIC and FTC in
their actions against CompuCredit. See id.
222. Cease-and-Desist-Order, supra note 220, at 4-13.
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In addition to the actions taken against the banks, the FDIC sued CompuCredit
seeking more than $4.8 million in civil penalties as well as consumer redress of
as much as $200 million. 223 This action names CompuCredit as an "institution-
affiliated" party of Columbus Bank which enables the FDIC to pursue restitution
and other remedies against the non-bank entity.2
24
In all of the matters, the FDIC has held financial institutions accountable for the
activities of its affiliate. FDIC Board member Thomas J. Curry expressed the mes-
sage quite directly: "[A] n institution's board of directors and senior management
are ultimately responsible for managing activities conducted through third-party
relationships, and identifying and controlling risks arising from such relation-
ships, to the same extent as if the activity were handled within the institution. 225
Mr. Curry also cited the FDIC's new Guidance for Managing Third-Party Risk,
issued on June 4, 2008.226
2. The Federal Trade Commission Polices Electronic
Payments Products and Services
In a parallel action to the FDIC proceedings, the FTC sued CompuCredit Cor-
poration and its subsidiary, Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC.227 The FTC alleges
violations of section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act and sections 806,
807, and 814 of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and seeks rescission and
reformation of contracts, restitution, and disgorgement. 2 8 In addition to behav-
ior alleged in conjunction with the FDIC's suit,229 the FTC alleged that Jefferson
played an "integral role in collecting charged-off receivables (often including
223. Notice of Charges for an Order to Cease and Desist and for Restitution; Notice of Assess-
ment of Civil Money Penalties; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; Order to Pay; and Notice of
Hearing at 19, In re CompuCredit Corp., FDIC-08-139b, FDIC-08-140k (June 18, 2008), available
at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/CompuCreditNotice-ofCharges.pdf (describing the
civil penalty of more than $4.8 million); FDIC Press Release, supra note 213 (estimating that restitu-
tion to consumers will exceed $200 million and that the civil penalty assessed against CompuCredit
would be $6.2 million).
224. See supra note 223; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u) (2006) (definition of "institution-affiliated"
party). For a discussion of this authority and its use in previous enforcement actions, see generally
James 0. Johnston, Jr. & Daniel Schott Schecter, Introduction: Kaye, Scholer and the OTS-Did Anyone
Go Too Far?, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 977 (1993);JonathanR. Macey&Geoffrey P. Miller, Kaye, Scholer FIRREA,
and the Desirability of Early Closure: A View of the Kaye, Scholer Casefrom the Perspective of Bank Regula-
tory Policy, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1115 (1993).
225. FDIC Press Release, supra note 213.
226. See id. (citing Guidance for Managing Third-Party Risk, FIL-44-2008 (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.
June 4, 2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2008/fi108044a.htm).
227. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Sues Subprime Credit Card Marketing Company
and Debt Collector for Deceptive Credit Card Marketing (June 10, 2008) (No. 0623212), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/06/compucredit.shtm.
228. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 1-2, FTC v. CompuCredit
Corp., No. 08 Civ. 1976 (N.D. Ga.June 10, 2008) [hereinafter "CompuCredit Complaint"]. Section 5(a)
of the Federal Trade Commission Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. section 45(a) (2006); sections 806, 807,
and 814 of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act are codified at 15 U.S.C. sections 1692d, 1692e &
16921 (2006).
229. See supra notes 213-19 and accompanying text.
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assessed fees) that CompuCredit generated through its Aspire Visa cards,"230 and
that CompuCredit
has had the sole and exclusive right to solicit applications for certain credit cards;
has created, designed, and distributed the marketing materials; established the credit
cards' terms and conditions; developed the underwriting and credit criteria; admin-
istered the card programs; maintained customer service functions; and purchased all
account receivables (except for a one-time sum that has been retained by the bank,
e.g., in the case of CB&T, $1 million), including fees, finance charges and principal
balances on purchases and cash advances.13 1
In addition, the FTC charges that, among other things, CompuCredit "misrepre-
sented the credit limits on its credit cards, failed to disclose the up-front fees charged
for some of its credit cards, and failed to disclose how certain transactions could
adversely affect the available credit on its credit cards. 2 32
In addition to the CompuCredit action, the FTC has in the last year taken ac-
tion against other card issuers and processors for unfair or deceptive practices. It
obtained injunctive relief and more than $26.4 million in damages from a group
of card processing companies for failure to deliver promised savings on credit card
interchange fees to merchants. 23 3 It sued EdebitPay, LLC, which markets prepaid
debit cards to subprime consumers through Internet sites, pop-up advertising,
and e-mail advertising.234 The EDebitPay defendants agreed to change their mar-
keting practices, pay $2,258,258 in consumer redress, and, in a highly unusual
provision for an FTC settlement, $667,228 in back taxes. 235 The FTC obtained a
$10 million judgment against Centurion Financial Benefits and a group of affili-
ated corporations and individuals who operated a massive telemarketing scheme
in which consumers were promised, for a fee of $249 each, a credit card with a
$2,000 line of credit but received only an application for a prepaid cash card. 236
An interesting twist to the case was that all of the defendants were based in Can-
ada, the telemarketing calls originated in Canada, and the FTC alleged that much
of the illegal activity occurred outside of the United States.2 37 In another cross-
border credit card marketing prosecution, the FTC won a judgment of $5 million
230. CompuCredit Complaint, supra note 228, at 4.
231. Id. at 6.
232. Id. at 7-8.
233. See FTC v. Merchant Processing, Inc., No. CV07-0533BR, slip op. at 9 (D. Or. May 5, 2008)
("Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief'), avail-
able at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523162/080515mpipi.pdf.
234. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Online Marketers of Prepaid Debit Cards to Subprime
Consumers Will Pay More than $2.2 Million to Settle FTC Charges (Jan. 24, 2008), http://www.ftc.
gov/opa/2008/O1/cards.shtm.
235. FTC v. EdebitPay, LLC, No. CV07-4880-ODW (AJWx), slip op. at 9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2008)
("Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Relief'), available at http://www.ftc.
gov/os/caselist/0623125/080117edebitpayfinalorder.pdf.
236. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Court Enters Final Orders and $10 Million Judgment
Against Last Centurion Defendants (Oct. 25, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/1O/centurion.shtm.
237. Id.
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from a group of Canadian-based defendants known as the Pacific Liberty Group
who charged people $319 each for a credit card and "complimentary gifts" which
were never received.
238
Finally, the FTC won a victory before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit, which upheld a judgment against Peoples Credit First, a company
that collected over $11 million from consumers who were "guaranteed" but never
received a platinum credit card with a $5,000 limit.239
B. DISTRICT COURT HOLDS E-GOLD LTD. IS A "MONEY
TRANSMITTING BUSINESS"
Our 2007 Survey provided an in-depth analysis of the criminal prosecution of
e-gold Ltd.-the company that issued the Internet-based international currency
backed by deposits of gold and other precious metals-on charges of money laun-
dering. 240 Since then, the district court has held that e-gold is a "money transmitting
business" subject to federal law.24 1 Shortly thereafter, e-gold entered into a plea
agreement resolving the charges against it.
242
The events that led to the conclusion of the case began on February 11, 2008,
when the defendants filed a motion to dismiss three of the four counts against
them. They argued that the government had failed to allege adequate facts to sup-
port the charges. 243 The defendants were charged under 18 U.S.C. section 1960,
which applies only to a "money transmitting business."244 In order to be a "money
transmitting business," an entity must engage in cash transactions. 245 The defen-
dants argued that because the government failed to allege that they had handled
cash (and, in fact, the defendants had not handled cash), the indictment must be
dismissed. 246 The court rejected the defendants' argument, concluding:
Section 1960 defines what it means to be unlicensed and what it means to engage
in money transmitting. By those definitions, a business can clearly engage in money
transmitting without limiting its transactions to cash or currency and would commit
a crime if it did so without being licensed.247
238. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Court Orders Cross-Border Telemarketers to Pay Nearly $5
Million (May 1, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/05/pacliberty.shtm.
239. FTC v. Peoples Credit First, LLC, 244 F App'x 942 (1 1th Cir. 2007), aff'g No. 8:03-CV-2353-T,
2005 WL 3468588 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2005).
240. See 2007 Survey, supra note 3, at 254-62.
241. United States v. E-gold, Ltd., 550 F Supp. 2d 82, 97 (D.D.C. 2008).
242. See Letter from Bernard S. Grimm, Esq., Cozen O'Connor, to Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. Attorney
(July 18, 2008) (plea agreement).
243. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counts Two, Three and
Four of the Indictment at 5, United States v. E-gold, Ltd., 550 F Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2008) [herein-
after "E-gold Motion to Dismiss"].
244. Id. at 6-7.
245. See 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2006).
246. E-gold Motion to Dismiss, supra note 243, at 5.
247. E-gold, 550 F Supp. 2d at 84.
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The court read section 1960 as providing an expansive definition of money trans-
mission: "Section 1960 defines 'money transmitting' broadly to including transfer-
ring 'funds,' not just currency, 'by any and all means['];[I it is not limited to cash
transactions. "248
The defendants had argued that under federal law, the term "money transmit-
ting business" is only defined in 31 U.S.C. section 5330, which provides that a
business can be considered a "money transmitting business" only if it is required
to file cash transaction reports under 31 U.S.C. section 5313.249 Section 5313, in
turn, places a reporting requirement only upon domestic financial institutions
involved in transactions of "United States coins and currency (or other monetary
instruments the Secretary of Treasury prescribes)."2 0 Accordingly, e-gold argued
that because section 5330 applies only if section 5313 is triggered, section 5330
must also require the handling of cash or coin.25' The court was not persuaded,
concluding that in fashioning section 1960, Congress did not borrow from section
5330, but rather relied upon 18 U.S.C. section 1955, which makes it a federal
crime to operate a gambling business in violation of state law 2 2 Looking at the
legislative history of section 1955, the court found that Congress used the term
"gambling business" to indicate that it sought to criminalize only large-scale illegal
gambling operations:
Because Section 1960 was modeled from Section 1955, it can be inferred that
Congress employed the term "business" after "money transmitting" in subsec-
tions (a) and (b)(1) of Section 1960 to indicate that Section 1960 was designed
to tackle large-scale operations as opposed to small-scale or individual money
transmitters.1253
The day before oral argument was held on the defendants' motion to dismiss,254
the government filed a superseding indictment that buttressed the "business" as-
pect of "money transmitting business" by alleging e-gold maintained "a cadre of
employees" and had transferred "approximately $145,535,374.26" in funds. 25
With these facts included in the indictment, the court concluded that e-gold was
a "money transmitter" and a "business" and thus was also a "money transmitter
business.""2 Anticipating that its reliance on the legislative history of 18 U.S.C.
section 1955-a statute not at issue in the case-might trouble some readers, the
court preemptively defended its analysis:
248. Id. at 88 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(2) (2006)).
249. E-gold Motion to Dismiss, supra note 243, at 7.
250. 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (2000).
251. E-gold Motion to Dismiss, supra note 243, at 7.
252. E-gold, 550 F Supp. 2d at 88-89.
253. Id. at 89.
254. Id. at 85 n.1.
255. Id. at 89.
256. Id.
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The Court recognizes that reliance on the legislative history of a separate, albeit his-
torically related, statute may not by itself eliminate all ambiguity from the phrase
"money transmitting business" in Section 1960 (assuming arguendo that any ambigu-
ity existed at the outset). The structure of the statute as well as the relevant canons of
statutory construction, however, guide the Court to the same conclusion.
257
The defendants also had argued that they could not be a "money transmitting
business" under section 5330 because they were not required to file currency
transaction reports under section 5313.258 The court rejected that argument, con-
cluding that even though e-gold had never handled currency or coin, it was still
subject to the currency reporting requirements:
A money transmitting business is no less a transmitter of money just because it does
not deal in currency Rather, Section 5313 comes into force and will require a report
if, when, and as the transmitter does engage in currency transactions.2' 9
In conclusion, the court was very clear in its view that handling cash is not the
touchstone of being a "money transmitting business" under federal law
The term "money transmitting business" as used in Section 5330 includes all financial
institutions that fall outside of the conventional financial system (and that are not a
"depository institution"), not just those that engage in cash transactions.2 60
The court's decision, however, raises as many questions as it answers. If all entities
could theoretically handle cash at some time in the future and thus be subject to
section 5313, how could being subject to section 5313 possibly serve as a limiting
factor in the application of section 1960(a)? What limitations, if any, are there on
the application of money transmitter business laws? If e-gold-an Internet-based
system that allows users to transfer among themselves electronic warehouse re-
ceipts for precious metals-must comply with federal money transmitter laws, then
do other similar Internet systems also need to come into compliance? Under the
e-gold decision, money transmitters do not have to handle cash, and transactions
do not have to be denominated in dollars. Does this mean that the various "virtual
world" games in which players trade elfin gold, magic potions, and valuable weap-
ons are now subject to money transmitter statutes? Is Coca-Cola running a money
transmitting business when it redeems codes found under bottle caps for prizes on
www.mycokerewards.com? Could executives of Mattel, along with Barbie and Ken,
be indicted for conspiracy to operate an unlicensed "money transmitting business"
because of the exchange of "B-Bucks" on www.barbiegirls.com? Unfortunately, the
e-gold decision only makes these types of questions more difficult to answer. Given
the plea agreement, the law of this case is not going to be refined upon appeal-
leaving business lawyers who work in this area to wander in dim light.
257. Id.
258. E-gold Motion to Dismiss, supra note 243, at 7.
259. E-gold, 550 E Supp. 2d at 95.
260. Id. at 93.
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CONCLUSION
Change is the touchstone of electronic payments and the law that governs them
here and abroad, whether payments are made through established and regulated
payments systems such as debit cards, credit cards, automated clearinghouse
debits or credits, or wire transfers, or through newer payments products such as
virtual currencies, mobile payments, or "remote deposit capture."26' Electronic
payments continue to generate legal controversies, such as how to classify prod-
ucts such as e-gold.
While we see the current proliferation of payments systems with different rules
in the United States, recent European developments suggest that it is possible to
harmonize the law of electronic payments. For example, the March 2007 Payment
Services Directive adopted by the European Union and European Parliament
62
has the goal of creating single, cross-border deposit accounts and harmonizing
payment obligations and laws for credit transfers, direct debits, and payment
cards across borders and payment instruments, 263 to be completed by 2010.264
As of January 28, 2008, "every credit transfer carried out in euros is processed in
the same way across Europe, with identical procedures and the same timeframe,"
although pricing will differ among banks for a while longer.265 Before Decem-
ber 31, 2010, European Union nations will have a Single Euro Payment Area
("SEPA") payment instrument for direct debits, while all current credit cards will
be replaced by interoperable, SEPA-compliant cards.266 Plans also call for cover-
age of Internet payments (currently govemed by the European Union's eMoney
Directive adopted in 2000)267 and for amendment of the eMoney Directive and its
integration into the Payment Services Directive.
268
261. Remote deposit capture allows consumers and businesses who are not in close proximity
to a branch of their depositary bank or who lack access to more sophisticated equipment for image
processing to use a commercial computer scanner to send images of the check they wish their bank
to collect on their behalf. The only access consumers in the United States currently have to remote
deposit capture is through USAA, the giant financial institution that serves individuals connected with
the military services. USAA's web site includes a video explaining how to use remote deposit capture.
USAA, USAA Deposit@Home, https://www.usaa.com/inet/entutils/McStaticPages?key=bank-deposit
(last visited June 11, 2008).
262. See Payment Services Directive Pushed Through by Parliament, EuRAcTIV.coM, Apr. 27, 2007,
http://www.euractiv.com/en/financial-services/payment-services-directive-pushed-parliament/
article-163368.
263. See Payment Services Directive: The End of the Cash Era?, EuRAcrlv.coM, July 11, 2008, http://
www.euractiv.com/enL/financial-services/payment-services-directive-cash-era/article- 171979.
264. See Payment Services Directive Pushed Through by Parliament, supra note 262.
265. SEPA: Easier Credit Transfers but Uncertain Cost Cuts, EusAcrlv.coM, Jan. 29, 2008, http://www.
euractiv.com/en/fnancial-services/sepa-easier-credit-transfers-uncertain-cost-cuts/article- 169907.
266. Id.
267. See Payment Services Directive: The End of the Cash Era?, supra note 263.
268. See id. For more information on the Single Euro Payments Area, see EUROPEAN PAYMENTS COUN-
CIL, MAKING SEPA A REALITY: IMPLEMENTING THE SINGLE EURO PAYMENTS AREA (Apr. 16, 2007), http://www.
europeanpaymentscouncil.eu/documents/EPCO66_06%20SEPA%200verview% 2 0vl.4.pdf (last vis-
ited June 15, 2008).
252 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 64, November 2008
Although the Directive technically does not change the law of payments in the
United States, progress toward the SEPA should encourage us to think about pur-
suing the harmonization of payments laws and regulations that was the subject of
the "Rethinking Payments Law" symposium in April 2007.269 Especially following
e-gold and other actions discussed in this Survey, financial services providers and
consumers in the United States need to be able to predict their rights and respon-
sibilities in payments generally and to avoid the expense of litigation over which
laws apply to which payment transactions.
269. See Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Rethinking Payments Law, https://www.newyorkfed.
org/registration/legalpaylaw/form.cfm (last visited June 18, 2008). For papers presented at the sym-
posium, see Symposium: Rethinking Payments Law, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 475 (2008).
